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THE ROLES OF CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA IN NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC 
CHANGE
By Mika Marumoto
Introduction
The year 2007 demonstrated more clearly than ever 
that external economic engagement provides a chance 
to help convince North Korea to abandon isolation 
and take specifi c actions toward denuclearization 
that could enable it to become a full member of the 
international community. In February 2007, a major 
breakthrough in the deadlocked six-nation nuclear 
talks, reconvening after a 13-month hiatus, accelerated 
North Korea’s denuclearization process in exchange 
for economic benefi ts provided by other member 
countries based on the action-for-action principle. 
In October 2007, a second South-North summit be-
tween the two Koreas, held seven years after the fi rst, 
landmark 2000 summit, demonstrated North Korea’s 
willingness to engage in hopes of reviving its failing 
economy. North Korea’s intensifi ed interactions with 
top-level leaders outside the region, including South-
east Asian countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia, as 
well as New Zealand, Switzerland, and the European 
Union, also demonstrated the critically important 
and potentially larger role that can be played by the 
international community in opening up North Korea 
through economic engagement.1
External Economic Engagement with North Korea
External economic engagement with North Korea is 
clearly growing more complex and calls for careful 
evaluation. But when and how can external economic 
engagement have the most positive impact in inducing 
North Korean opening and reform, and not merely 
prolong North Korea’s regime survival? What sorts 
of external economic engagement are most likely to 
engender transformation to a market economy?
To shed light on this puzzle, it makes sense to focus 
on the two most signifi cant external economic-engage-
ment players during the Kim Jong-il era (1998–2007): 
China and South Korea. My central assumption is 
that, at the current stage of North Korea’s economic 
transformation, the most important aspect of external 
economic engagement is demonstrating to North 
Koreans that markets are superior to a command-
and-control system for organizing and promoting 
economic activity. Economic engagement by these 
two neighbors has often been bundled together by 
regional analysts, who sometimes criticize Chinese 
and South Korean engagement as merely prolonging 
North Korean regime survival. A closer look shows 
that, although China and South Korea are both hav-
ing an impact on North Korean economic policy, they 
can be differentiated in terms of their transformative 
impact. As has been noted by some scholars,2 China’s 
engagement to date has been more commercial and, 
therefore, more transformative than South Korea’s 
engagement.
If we examine the two countries’ economic engage-
ment, looking specifi cally and separately at engage-
ment by actors at four distinct levels—central gov-
ernment, local government, enterprises, and grass 
roots—the picture becomes still clearer. In particular, 
it becomes possible to more precisely answer the ques-
tions of why and how China’s economic engagement 
has been more commercial and transformative than 
South Korea’s thus far.
A main fi nding of this four-level analysis is that Chi-
nese economic engagement at the local government 
and business levels, primarily as organized by actors 
resident in China’s northeast provinces, has served as 
1. For example, see “Peters Briefs Rice on North Korea Trip,” tvnz.co.nz, 20 November 2007, http://tvnz.co.nz/view/
page/411368/1454981; and “North Korea Premier Arrives in Vietnam to seek Financing, Mining Cooperation,” Yonhap News 
Agency (Seoul), 26 October 2007. At the private sector level, it was noteworthy that an Australia-based trust company, Maranatha 
Sinyong Ltd., planned to provide micro credits to local business in North Korea. 
2. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” Working Paper 07-7 (Washington, D.C.: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2007), 19–20, 28, www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/wp/wp07-7.pdf.
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an especially potent catalyst in North Korean economic 
change. These provinces can also serve as a model for 
North Korea’s future economic development.
As for South Korea’s economic engagement, it has 
also had some infl uence on North Korean economic 
policy, but it is apparent that historical and geopolitical 
conditions as well as different national interests and 
goals have produced markedly different engagement 
patterns by China and South Korea. South Korea in 
particular faces diffi cult hurdles that have prevented 
it from making its engagement more relevant to 
North Korea’s economic market development or its 
policymaking conducive to a more market-based 
economy.
Four Channels for Inducing Economic Change
North Korea’s economic policy can be infl uenced via 
four key channels:
1. Central government economic policy dialogue and 
nationally organized trade and investment pro-
grams, which could be conducive to the expansion 
of the North Korean market economy and legal 
foreign trade and investment;
2. Organized economic activity and learning, including 
foreign trade, handled by local governments;
3. Economic interaction at the enterprise level, linking 
foreign industrial concerns to the North Korean 
domestic economy; and
4. The expansion of grassroots-level cross-border eco-
nomic interaction, including barter trade by private 
citizens using markets to obtain daily necessities.
Remembering the above four channels, we now look 
for evidence of infl uence on North Korea policy by 
looking at four metrics:
1. Pattern of top-leader interactions and subsequent 
policy changes or attempts at changes such as 
adjustments in incentive structures, expansion of 
the market segment of the economy, or shifting of 
resources from the planned sector (including the 
military) to the market sector;
2. Frequency and outcome of interactions at the local 
government level, including any resulting impact 
on trade and investment patterns;
3. Commercial interaction between foreign enterprises 
and domestic industrial concerns; and
4. Grassroots interaction including informal trade and 
the resulting expansion of general markets.
A quick examination of Chinese and South Korean 
interaction with North Korea at each level of economic 
engagement can shed light on what sorts of economic 
engagement have proved most effective in inducing 
reform and opening in North Korea thus far. 
Central Government Engagement and 
Policy Change
Chinese and South Korean economic engagement at 
the national or leadership level is motivated by core 
national interests and priorities—economic gain and 
stability in the case of China, and reconciliation and 
eventual reunifi cation in the case of South Korea. 
These priorities naturally influence the character 
and impact of these countries’ respective economic 
engagement activities with North Korea.
China–North Korea Top Leadership and Central 
Government Interactions
Economic policy discussions between Chinese and 
North Korean top leaders actually predate the Kim 
Jong-il era.3 North Korea’s most important economic 
policy reform ideas can in fact be traced to North Ko-
rea’s interactions with China’s pro-reform top leaders 
starting as early as the 1980s, immediately after China 
embarked on its reform and opening policy in 1978.
Offi cial meetings and visits. At least fi ve top leader-
ship meetings between China and North Korea in the 
early 1980s specifi cally focused on economic mat-
ters. For example, Kim Il-sung’s last visit to China, 
3. For a full treatment of this topic see, Mika Marumoto, “North Korea and the China Model: The Switch from Hostility to Acqui-
escence,” Academic Paper Series 2, no. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, May 2007), www.keia.org/2-Publications/
Marumoto.pdf.
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in October 1991, included a side trip to Shandong to 
study China’s strategy for its special economic zones. 
Adoption of North Korea’s new foreign trade promo-
tion policy in 1984 as well as the enactment of the Joint 
Venture Law in 1984 and the creation of special eco-
nomic zones at Rajin-Sonbong and the Tumen River 
in early 1990s directly followed trips to China where 
these initiatives were discussed in some detail.
Since Kim Jong-il assumed full control of North Ko-
rean affairs in 1998, he has made four trips to China: 
Beijing in May 2000, Shanghai in January 2001, 
Beijing and Tianjin in April 2004, and Guangdong in 
January 2006. Each time, Kim conducted site visits 
to successful Chinese industrial concerns and joint 
ventures. Following each visit, North Korea appeared 
to attempt certain Chinese-style reforms, and policy 
experiments expanded to include new special eco-
nomic zones and new economic incentives set forth 
in the July 2002 reforms. In 2004, in particular, Kim 
Jong-il and President Hu Jintao pledged that the two 
countries would continue high-level contacts to fur-
ther develop trade and economic cooperation. At the 
meeting, Kim also expressed his interest in “mutual 
learning and an exchange of experiences.”
Transformative impact of China’s aid. China has 
also historically been a critical provider of aid to North 
Korea. China consistently provided food and energy, 
even after the socialist bloc’s demise in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (except in 1994 when Chinese food 
production suffered and food exports were banned as 
a result), apparently without much linkage to bilateral 
policy agendas. More recently, however, China’s aid 
to the Kim Jong-il regime appears to be aimed more 
strategically at having a transformative impact, espe-
cially in terms of its “policy conditionality.”
Amid the nuclear crisis, China is said to have negoti-
ated with North Korea certain conditions for provision 
of food and fuel aid by linking its aid to economic 
reform and opening measures or the six-party talks.4 
President Hu Jintao, during his visit to Pyongyang 
on 28–30 October 2005, for instance, made it clear 
to Kim Jong-il that, although China was consider-
ing plans to provide $2 billion in assistance to North 
Korea, China would not provide the aid unless North 
Korea presented concrete reform and opening plans.5 
Subsequently, North Korea fl oated the idea of setting 
up a new special economic zone in North P’yongan 
where Chinese fi rms would provide equipment and 
technology and North Korea would provide land and 
human resources.6
China’s aid has also taken on some indirect aspects of 
“military restructuring.” For example, China provided 
$20 million in investment funds and food aid to fa-
cilitate the construction of the Daean glass factory in 
South P’yongan Province in October 2005. Retired and 
“excellent” military personnel selected by the Korean 
Workers’ Party and the North Korean government 
have been put to work at the factory,7 apparently as a 
reward for prior service as well as to facilitate convert-
ing military labor to more productive uses. Awarding 
medals to military personnel has long been a political 
tool used by Kim Jong-il to solidify his legitimacy 
and gain support from the military, but this may be 
the fi rst time Kim has rewarded military offi cers for 
contributing to economic reconstruction. Although the 
scale and overall impact of this one project is small, 
the endeavor echoes Deng Xiaoping’s decisive mili-
tary restructuring in the 1980s, when Deng sought to 
reassign military cadres to nonmilitary work without 
humiliating those losing their military status.
Inter-Korean Top Leadership and Central 
Government Interactions
Thus far, only two summits have taken place between 
South Korean and North Korean leaders. The fi rst 
summit, between President Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Jong-il in June 2000, was primarily symbolic in nature, 
4. Gendai Korea [Modern Korea; publication of Modern Korea Institute, Tokyo], March 2006, 20. 
5. Ibid., 20–21.
6. Nikkei Shimbun, 1 December 2005. 
7. “North Korean Economic Dynamics [in Chinese],” Chaoxian Jingji Dongtai he Xinwen (???????publication of the Small China-
DPRK Investor Association, Dandong), 12 June 2006, http://kortr.cn/main/home/ns_detail.php?id=16&nowmenuid=3&cpath=&
catid=0.
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but it was historically signifi cant in affi rming mutual 
recognition of each Korea’s existence and legitimacy. 
Subsequent to the Kim-Kim summit, high-level gov-
ernment interactions were institutionalized, including 
the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the Inter-
Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee. 
Economic cooperation projects such as the Kaesong 
industrial complex, Mt. Kumgang tourism resort, and 
the inter-Korean railway and road reconnection efforts 
followed thereafter.
The second summit, between President Roh Moo-hyun 
and Kim Jong-il in October 2007, increased the focus 
on inter-Korean economic cooperation and aimed at 
creating an enabling environment for the two Koreas 
to accelerate inter-Korean political reconciliation. A 
new economic cooperation package unveiled at the 
summit by President Roh included establishment of 
a “peace and cooperation zone” in the West Sea area, 
the building of a new joint industrial complex replicat-
ing the Kaesong complex, construction of additional 
infrastructure such as roads and railways linking the 
two Koreas, and joint efforts to develop underground 
mineral resources. The two Korean leaders simultane-
ously issued a joint statement emphasizing their agree-
ment to resolve the issue of reunifi cation according 
to the spirit of “by-the-Korean-people-themselves.”8 
This emphasis on exclusive Korean responsibility for 
peninsular reconciliation can be interpreted to result 
in part from the South Korean government’s fear of 
growing Chinese infl uence over the North Korean 
economy.
South Korea faces a more daunting challenge than 
China in making its economic engagement with North 
Korea transformative in nature. Because Korea is a 
divided nation, North-South cooperation patterns that 
might highlight the disparity between South Korea’s 
successes and North Korea’s failures, or put South 
Korea in the position of tutor and North Korea in the 
position of pupil, are uniquely threatening to North 
Korea’s leaders. As a result, the mandate of inter-
Korean economic cooperation projects such as the 
Kaesong industrial complex has been complicated, 
aiming at multiple objectives such as maintaining 
South Korean business competitiveness, facilitating 
peace on the Korean peninsula, and improving the 
North Korean economy—all while cushioning North 
Korea from the social and political impact of unfet-
tered economic interchange with South Korea. In 
practice, North Korea has maintained greater control 
over the scope and speed of inter-Korean economic 
cooperation than it has over China–North Korea eco-
nomic aid and cooperation.
The geographically segregated Kaesong industrial 
zone, for example, has thus far generated only limited 
demonstration effects or spillover effects for the North 
Korean internal economy. Direct wage payments to 
Kaesong workers have still not been implemented 
although four years have passed since the launch of 
the project. Meanwhile, North Korea’s sudden and 
unilateral announcement of wage increases in the sum-
mer of 2007 was a blow to South Korean small- and 
medium-size investors in the project. North Korea 
also made only limited concessions concerning South 
Korean requests for easier physical access to the 
Kaesong economic zone, as sought during follow-up 
economic talks at the deputy-prime-minister level in 
early December 2007.9
In general, while many in South Korea are eager 
to expand and institutionalize more profound inter-
Korean economic exchanges, North Korea appears to 
be most interested in obtaining economic benefi ts that 
can be used for the revival of its planned economy—
without transforming the North Korean economy or its 
people’s mind-set. Because South Korea is perpetually 
negotiating at a disadvantage—as the demander rather 
than the demandee—South Korean assistance has 
fallen into a pattern that does not call for signifi cant 
conditionality related to opening and reform on North 
Korea’s part. This of course stems from the North 
Korean leadership’s psychological fear of opening the 
country’s borders to South Korea, which exceeds its 
concern about North Korea’s possibly deeper reliance 
8. “Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” Ministry of Unifi cation, Seoul, 4 
October 2007, http://unikorea.go.kr/english/EPA/EPA0101R.jsp?main_uid=2181.
9. Heejin Koo, “North Korea, South Korea Fail to Agree on Economic Zone Access,” Bloomberg.com, 7 December 2006, www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXIUAwkKQMbs.
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on China.10 The “reunifi cation pressure” or “existential 
threat” that North Korea perceives from South Korea 
remains palpable, even though two summit meetings 
have reaffi rmed the two nations’ mutual recognition 
and parallel legitimacy.
Local Government Engagement and Policy 
Change
Engagement with North Korea by South Korean local 
government entities has thus far consisted mostly of 
sporadic humanitarian assistance in the form of food or 
medicine—occasionally extending to small develop-
ment projects. Even so, the North Korean counterpart 
for South Korean local government economic aid 
has usually been the central government rather than 
lower-level entities.
In contrast, the main part of China’s commercial en-
gagement with North Korea has been driven by Chi-
nese local governments, and the North Korean cabinet 
has delegated authority to its local governments to deal 
directly with Chinese counterparts, including conduct-
ing negotiations on major Chinese investments.
Chinese municipal, prefectural, and provincial 
governments and government-affiliated entrepre-
neurs—particularly from China’s three northeastern 
provinces—are showing heightened enthusiasm about 
deepening their economic links to North Korea. As a 
result, North Korea’s exposure to Chinese economic 
policy and business norms has expanded rapidly via 
these channels in recent years. The trend temporarily 
subsided immediately after North Korea’s missile 
launch and nuclear test in 2006, but it persists as a 
fundamental trend.
From the perspective of China’s central government, 
the economic development of China’s northeastern 
region has been among its most challenging agendas, 
as the regional economy remains dominated by state-
owned heavy industries that are still going through a 
relatively slow and painful reform process. To tackle 
this problem, in October 2003 and May 2005 the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
announced revised guidelines for the development of 
China’s three northeastern provinces. Subsequently, 
the provincial governments themselves drafted a 
comprehensive development plan linking the coun-
try’s northeastern region not only with neighboring 
Chinese cities and provinces but also with key North 
Korean cities. In support of this concept, city offi cials 
in Dandong were quoted as saying, for example, that 
Dandong had been long neglected by Beijing owing to 
its close proximity to North Korea, which made it into 
a “danger zone.”11 Now, they said, Dandong enjoyed 
many advantages because of its location on the border 
between North Korea and China.
In this milieu, Chinese local governments and enter-
prises are actively and independently pursuing com-
mercially viable trade and investment deals with North 
Korea. This includes the acquisition of mineral rights, 
which is increasingly cited by some South Koreans as 
evidence of China’s “excessive” economic infl uence 
over North Korea. The most alarmist South Koreans 
worry that North Korea is “becoming the fourth 
Northeast province of China.”12 By some estimates, 
Chinese groups have invested as much as $100 mil-
lion in improving the extractive capacity of North 
Korean mines.
In fact, Chinese local government engagement with 
North Korea has stimulated signifi cant market-based 
trade, exposing North Korean offi cials to market norms 
and practices and serving as a catalyst in transforming 
the North Korean economy. Both offi cial and unoffi cial 
visits at the municipal and provincial levels between 
China and North Korea have increased dramatically. 
Examples include not only major offi cial visits to 
10. See Liu Ming, “North Korean Economic Reform: An Uncertain Future for a Third-Way Exploration,” in Joint U.S.-Korea Aca-
demic Studies: Dynamic Forces on the Korean Peninsula: Strategic & Economic Implications 17 (2007): 93–94. 
11. “China’s Northeast Plans Include Korea,” Dong-A Ilbo, 21 March 2006, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.
php3?biid=2006032125648&path_dir=20060321. 
12. “China’s Colonization of North Korea,” ChosunIlbo, 9 March 2007, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/
news/200703/200703090036.html; “China Feared Grabbing Up Resources in North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 22 November 2007, 
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200711/200711220005.html; and “North Korea Becoming China’s ‘Fourth North-
eastern Province’,” Chosun Ilbo, 20 November 2007, http://English.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200711/200711230025.html.
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promote trade and investment in North Korea but also 
various functional exchanges including, for example, 
a visit in 2005 that resulted in a bilateral agreement 
on enhancing product quality control.
Unlike in South Korea, no Chinese entity compiles 
and publicly releases information tracking engage-
ment with North Korea. Anecdotes of Chinese local 
government economic interaction with North Korea 
are numerous and constantly multiplying. One no-
table example took place in September 2005 when 
a 110-member delegation (including delegates from 
30 North Korean enterprises) headed by the North 
Korean minister of foreign trade participated in the 
fi rst Northeast Asia Trade and Investment Exhibition 
at Changchun, Jilin Province. The aim was to induce 
Chinese enterprises to actively participate in North 
Korean economic construction, infrastructure and 
industrial development, and the improvement of North 
Korean agricultural technology. The Changchun event 
was the fi rst North Korean investment promotion 
forum held in China in 10 years, apparently signaling 
increased interest on the part of North Korea to open up 
the country from within. Only two years later, in 2007, 
Chinese participants in the third Jilin-based Northeast 
Asia Trade and Investment Exhibition were reportedly 
surprised by the North Korean participants’ aggressive 
attitude toward business promotion. For the fi rst time, 
the Chinese dealmakers witnessed the North Koreans 
outlining specifi c project proposals and offering video 
presentations of their export products.13
Business-to-Business Engagement and Its 
Impact
China and North Korea have had signifi cant contact 
during the six decades since the division of the Ko-
rean peninsula, so it is only natural that North Korean 
entities feel more comfortable dealing with Chinese 
government offi cials or business entities than they do 
working with their South Korean counterparts. At the 
enterprise level as well, it is not surprising that China–
North Korea interaction, linking Chinese industrial 
concerns with North Korean domestic companies, 
remains broader and deeper than North Korea’s deal-
ings with South Korean counterparts. Up until now, in 
fact, South Korean corporate activity in North Korea 
has for the most part been confi ned to relatively simple 
contracts aimed at taking advantage of North Korea’s 
low-wage labor force.
Chinese Entrepreneurs and the Northeast China 
Model
Chinese businesspeople express the view that China–
North Korea business-to-business relationships have 
deepened in recent years—driven by market op-
portunities and imperatives rather than by top-down 
political intentions. In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs have 
long kept their eyes on potential emerging-market op-
portunities in North Korea. During the past 10 years, 
for instance, Chinese representatives have consistently 
attended North Korea’s annual trade fairs in Pyong-
yang, sending by far the largest number of companies. 
At the ninth Pyongyang Spring International Trade 
Fair in 2006, 179 out of 196 participating companies 
were from China.14 The following year’s trade fair at-
tracted more than 200 companies from 13 countries, of 
which more than half were from China.15 South Korean 
participants were relative newcomers, attending the 
fair for just the second time in 2007.
Among the most notable anecdotal examples of 
business-to-business engagement between China and 
North Korea was the establishment in 1997 of Hwaryo 
Bank, a Chinese–North Korean joint venture. Hwaryo 
Bank offers fund management services to North Kore-
ans abroad as well as to Chinese and other foreign na-
13. Tetsuya Suetsugu, “North Korea Becoming More Proactive over Trade with China,” Daily Yomiuri Online, 7 September 
2007. 
14. “North Korea International Trade Fair WelcomesForeign Participants: Glass Products Produced by the Factory Assisted by 
China Received Favorable Reaction [in Chinese],” Chaoxian Jingji Dongtai he Xinwen, 9 June 2006, http://www.kortr.cn/main/
home/ns_detail.php?id=8&nowmenuid=3&cpath=&catid=0. 
15. Korea Central News Agency, 14 May 2007; quoted in “Major Development—North Korea Holds Annual Trade Fair with More 
Than 200 Companies,” Vantage Point (Yonhap News Agency, Seoul) 30, no. 6 (June 2007): 31–32.
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tionals residing in North Korea, and it invests capital in 
high-profi t ventures.16 Another prominent case was the 
December 2005 contract reached by a Chinese state-
owned trading company with North Korea’s Central 
Import Goods Exchange General Company to jointly 
establish a new general market in Pyongyang where 
goods imported from more than 20 Chinese companies 
would be exhibited and sold.17 More recently, in 2007, 
North Korea’s Daepung Investment Group boldly 
announced that it would set up a major investment 
fund with the help of the China Development Bank to 
provide fi nancing to Chinese companies as they build 
roads, railways, and ports in North Korea.18
Some Chinese investors apparently believe that invest-
ing in North Korea now will enable them to enjoy trail-
blazers’ advantages in North Korea in the future,19 as 
they expect that North Korea will inevitably embark on 
a path toward economic reform and recovery similar to 
China’s experience following the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in the 1970s. Chinese residing in China’s 
three northeastern provinces, in particular, tend to 
view North Korea’s current economic conditions and 
personal consumption level as similar to the situation 
in China in the early 1980s, with its great potential 
for future growth.20 This intuitive expectation of an 
eventual North Korean takeoff may also be related to 
the fact that China’s northeastern provinces share not 
only geographical proximity with North Korea but also 
similar initial conditions in terms of their economic 
size and industrial structure (Table 1).
Observers of North Korea often argue that the transi-
tion models of China and Vietnam, which as generally 
understood depended critically on agricultural reform 
as a key to their success, cannot serve as a reference 
for industry-dominated North Korea’s future develop-
ment. But a close look at China’s three northeastern 
provinces could tell a different story. North Korea’s 
current industrial structure is, for example, remarkably 
similar to what existed in Jilin Province 20 years ago, 
in terms of both output and employment. Both Jilin and 
North Korea featured a pronounced bias toward heavy 
industry and large state-owned operations as opposed 
to more diverse light industry. Jilin’s economic size 
in 1985 as well as its trade and foreign direct invest-
ment infl ows were much smaller than the current totals 
for North Korea. Yet, during those 20 years, Jilin’s 
economy grew to enjoy twice as much trade as North 
Korea and six times as much foreign investment while 
it has rapidly expanded its service sector in terms of 
employment creation. This lends hope and credence 
to the idea that North Korea could successfully open 
and reform its economy by drawing upon lessons from 
northeast China—with those lessons being transmitted 
by Chinese enterprises (and local governments) based 
in the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang 
(Table 2).
South Korea’s Experimental Investments in North 
Korea
South Korean entrepreneurs and corporations, mean-
while, have made slower progress in deepening and 
broadening enterprise-level engagement with North 
Korean counterparts. Their engagement has been 
somewhat sporadic and random, depending on a range 
of motivations on the South Korean side that are not 
always related to expectations of quick profi tability. 
Still, during the past 10 years, a certain set of South 
Korean companies has made signifi cant efforts in 
engaging North Korea, including via the Kaesong 
industrial complex.
16. Trade and Chosun, January 2005; quoted by Kim Sung-jin, “Overseas Funds for Investment in North Korea,” Vantage Point 
30, no. 5 (May 2007): 21–22.
17. Gendai Korea, March 2006, 21.<?>  Gendai Korea, March 2006, 21.
18. Bomi Lim, “North Korea, China Will Start $10 Billion Fund, Yonhap Reports,” Bloomberg.com, 13 November 2007, www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=aQoHi.iCFLBk. 
19. Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency’s Analysis Based on Heilongjiang Weekly News, 16 February 2005; quoted in 
“Chinese Enterprises Eye Investment Opportunities in North Korea [in Japanese],” East Asia Economic Information (East Asia 
Trade Research Board, Tokyo), no. 141, March 2005, 11–15.
20. Ibid.
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South Korea’s Hyundai Group, following a path 
forged by the group’s late founder, Chung Ju-yung, 
has played a particularly prominent role in promoting 
North-South business ties. Chung originally suggested 
the idea of the Kaesong industrial complex to Kim 
Jong-il in 1998, and North Korea promulgated a law 
establishing the complex and in late 2002 designated 
Hyundai Asan Corporation to be the main developer. 
Full-scale construction started in 2004, with the fi rst 
stage completed in 2007. Thus far, approximately 52 
small- and medium-size South Korean enterprises 
operate in the complex, employing about 20,000 North 
Korean laborers.21 According to plans endorsed by the 
South Korean Ministry of Unifi cation, upon comple-
tion of three phases in 2012, up to 2,000 companies 
will be operating in the complex, with total invest-
ments amounting to $8 billion, and will be employing 
more than 300,000 North Korean workers. Whether 
these ambitious plans will be realized remains to be 
seen.
21. “Completion Ceremony of Infrastructures in 1st Phase KIC,” Hyundai Asan Newsletter (Hyundai Asan Corporation), October 
2007, www.hyundai-asan.com/newsletter/eng_200710/sub3_03.html.
Table 1: Economic Profiles of North Korea, China, and China’s Northeastern Provinces, 1985 
compared with 2005 
Characteristics
North Korea China Jilin Heilongjiang Liaoning
2005–06 1985 2005 2005 1985 2005 1985 2005 1985
Population 
(million) 
22 18.5 1,308 27 23 38 34 42 37
GDP (U.S. 
dollars, billion) 
40 45 2,235 44 7 67 12 98 18
Primary 30% — 13% 17% 28% 12% 22% 11% 14%
Secondary 34% — 48% 44% 48% 54% 58% 49% 63%
Tertiary 36% — 40% 39% 24% 34% 21% 40% 22%
Exports (U.S. 
dollars, million) 
1,338 1,111 761,950 2,467 427 6,072 410 23,440 5,040 
Imports (U.S. 
dollars, million) 
2,718 1,290 659,950 4,061 124 3,500 100 17,570 350
Inflow of 
foreign direct 
investment
(U.S. dollars, 
million) 
135 — 60,325 661 25 1,447 — 3,590 —
Data per capita (U.S. dollars) 
GDP 1,788 2,432 1,709 1,634 297 1,761 360 2,322 479
Exports 60 60 583 91 19 159 12 557 137
Imports 122 70 505 150 5 92 3 417 9
FDI 6 — 46 24 1 38 — 85 —
Sources: North Korea’s GDP and GDP per capita are 2006 estimates based on purchasing power parity (PPP); 
industrial structure figures are 2002 estimates; see “North Korea,” World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: Central 
Intelligence Agency), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html; inflows of foreign 
direct investment to the DPRK are 2006 estimates: World Investment Report 2007 (Geneva: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2007), www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1485&lang=1; for 
North Korea’s 1985 GDP and data per capita, see national incomes estimated by Eui-Gak Hwang, The Korean 
Economies: A Comparison of North and South (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1993); data for China are based on 
Chinese government official statistics: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2006; Jilin Statistical Yearbook 2006; 
Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2006; Liaoning Statistical Yearbook 2006.
Note: China’s GDP and GDP per capita, if based on PPP, are estimated to be $10.2 trillion and $7,800, respectively. 
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Table 2: Industrial Structure by Employment in  
North Korea, China, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and  
Jilin, 1978–2005, percentage 
Jurisdiction Year Primary Secondary Tertiary 
North Korea 2002 36 64
China 1978 71 17 12
1985 62 21 17
1992 59 22 20
2005 45 24 31
Liaoning 1978 47 35 18
1985 36 41 23
1992 33 41 26
2005 34 28 38
Heilongjiang 1978 53 29 18
1985 41 35 24
1992 37 36 27
2005 46 21 33
Jilin 1978 49 32 19
1985 45 31 24
1992 48 29 24
2005 46 19 36
Sources: “North Korea,” World Factbook
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency),  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/kn.html; China Statistical Yearbook 2006;  
Liaoning Statistical Yearbook; Heilongjiang Statistical 
 Yearbook 2006; Jilin Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
Given the geographical proximity of their corporate 
headquarters, the absence of language barriers, and 
low wage costs in North Korea, South Korean enter-
prises—especially small- and medium-size companies 
involved in labor-intensive manufacturing—have 
started to express increased interest in investing in 
North Korea. Several hundred have applied to join 
the Kaesong project, with more than 50 enterprises 
reportedly saying they might withdraw investments 
from other Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, 
and Indonesia in order to shift operations to North 
Korea.22 These fi rms, however, have not shown the 
ability to reach out directly to North Korea with the 
protective umbrella of the Hyundai project.
In contrast with the cautious yet somewhat positive 
attitude shown by smaller South Korean companies 
toward investing in North Korea, South Korea’s larger 
corporations have been decidedly unenthusiastic about 
investing or trading with North Korea. For example, 
when the Kaesong industrial complex support team 
of the Ministry of Unifi cation visited the Federation 
of Korean Industries in May 2006 to encourage large 
member corporations to move into the complex, an 
executive of a large corporation was quoted as saying 
that it would be “diffi cult” to enter the complex; he 
cited the nuclear issue as well as restrictions on ship-
ping strategic technologies to North Korea.23 President 
Roh Moo-hyun recruited major South Korean corpora-
tions to join him at the second inter-Korean summit in 
October 2007, but after the event business representa-
tives stressed mainly the diffi culties of doing business 
in North Korea.24 Inter-Korean trade and investment 
seem to be still characterized by top-down directives 
and government-led attempts to make institutional 
arrangements for future expansion of more organic 
North-South business ties.
There is, of course, huge potential for future engage-
ment by South Korean enterprises in North Korea. 
Aside from the possible exception of the Pyeonghwa 
Motors project, however, there are remarkably few 
success stories to date of penetrating the so-called real 
North Korean economy in a normal way, without the 
benefi t of participation in a central government–sup-
ported project. Pyeonghwa Motors was established in 
2002 as an automobile assembly joint venture between 
South Korea’s Pyeonghwa Group (which is owned by 
the Unifi cation Church) and North Korea’s Chosun 
People’s Leisure Group. At its factory in Nampo it 
22. “North Korea Will Become Asia’s New Economic Performer [in Chinese],” Chaoxian Jingji Dongtai he Xinwen, 6 July 2007, 
www.kortr.cn/main/home/ns_detail.php?id=666&nowmenuid=3&cpath=&catid=0. 
23. Jeong-hun Park, “Government Pressures Firms to Join Gaesong,” Dong-A Ilbo, 11 May 2006, http://english.donga.com/srv/
service.php3?biid=2006051184048&path_dir=20060511. 
24. Kim Deok-hyun, “Inter-Korean Business Cooperation: Will South’s Big Companies Try Their Luck?”??????????????30 Sep-
tember 2007; see also “Businessmen Worry That North Korea Is Unprepared for Further Economic Cooperation,” Dong-A Ilbo, 6 
October 2007, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2007100694828&path_dir=20071006.
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assembles annually about 600–700 vehicles, including 
sedans, sport-utility vehicles, and minibuses, using 
imported parts and chassis. It plans to start producing 
pickups using frames and engines made in the Chinese 
city of Shenyang.25 Pyeonghwa’s eventual (and ambi-
tious) goal is to target export markets.
As for the Kaesong industrial complex, the long-term 
viability of the project and its contribution to North 
Korean economic development may depend on how 
much the current business model—using North Ko-
rean land and workers as inputs for foreign, mostly 
South Korean, manufacturers—can be diversifi ed to 
allow internal linkages to North Korean contractors 
and input suppliers and to allow equity joint ventures 
with North Korean state-owned enterprises that would 
employ both North Korean and South Korean manag-
ers. Such changes could generate signifi cant spillover 
benefi ts for the North Korean economy beyond Kae-
song, improving productivity through technological, 
technical, and managerial knowledge transfer. South 
Korean investment in North Korea, both in Kaesong 
and elsewhere, would also be made more attractive if 
economic sanctions (limiting high-technology exports 
to North Korea and impeding imports of North Korea’s 
end products) imposed by the United States and other 
countries were lifted—a likelihood that is probably 
dependent on North Korean denuclearization. In short, 
true realization of the Kaesong dream depends on 
North Korea’s willingness to open its economy and 
society further.
Grassroots Engagement and Its Impact
South Korea’s grassroots-level interactions with North 
Korea are for the most part carried out by nongovern-
mental organizations and are aimed at easing tensions 
between the citizens of the two Koreas. The hope is 
that, by providing humanitarian assistance, South Ko-
rean citizens can help foster trust and deepen mutual 
understanding.
It is clear that grassroots activities conducted by 
South Korean private voluntary organizations have 
become quite common in North Korea in recent 
years.26 Typical projects entail provision of foodstuffs 
or other commodities such as medicine, livestock, 
or agricultural machinery. But the activities of these 
groups remain sporadic and are tightly controlled by 
North Korean counterparts. It is also not uncommon 
for such activities to be subject to sudden cancellation, 
depending on the winds of overall inter-Korean rela-
tions. Thus, it is diffi cult for grassroots South Korean 
groups, even those providing economic aid, to have 
a meaningful impact on North Korea’s internal eco-
nomic practices. Many other North-South cooperative 
grassroots activities are primarily academic, athletic, 
religious, or cultural in nature and therefore do not 
provide opportunities for South Koreans to “preach” 
market economics or provide a practical example of 
market-based economic activities for North Korean 
counterparts to observe.
In contrast with the nonprofi t orientation of South 
Korean grassroots interaction with North Korea, 
China’s grassroots engagement has very much focused 
on generating a profi t for its organizers. As a result, 
the most prominent forms of individually organized 
activity—cross-border barter trade and small-scale 
entrepreneurship—have had a direct impact on the 
expansion of the market economy segment in North 
Korea, including the emergence of informal markets. 
Farmers’ markets resembling China’s fi rst appeared in 
North Korea as early as the 1980s, and they expanded 
signifi cantly in the 1990s as places where North Ko-
rean citizens could access barter-trade goods and make 
quasi-legal purchases of food and other essentials, 
which were especially important during North Korea’s 
unprecedented famine in the mid-1990s.
In 2003, North Korea transformed the nation’s quasi-
legal farmers’ markets into roughly 300 legalized 
general markets. A substantial proportion of the items 
on sale at these markets are imported from China, 
and many of those have been carried into the country 
as “backpack” trade organized by entrepreneurial 
individuals rather than handled by established agents. 
Some experts estimate that offi cial statistics on China–
25. “Pyeonghwa Motors, China’s Brilliance in Talks to Produce Trucks in North Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, 1 August 2007, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2007/08/01/21/0401000000AEN20070801001700320F.HTML. 
26. For details, see “Expansion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation,” chap. 3 of “White Paper” (Seoul: Ministry of Unifi ca-
tion, June 2005), www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EUL/EUL0301L.jsp.
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North Korea trade may underestimate actual trade 
volumes by as much as 30 percent because those sta-
tistics fail to capture the informal cross-border trade. 
Thus, from the supply side, Chinese individuals are 
having a big impact on the development of market 
mechanisms in North Korea.
This grassroots engagement is sometimes supported 
and encouraged by Chinese local governments. 
China’s Tumen City, for example, with the blessing 
of the North Korean cabinet this year negotiated the 
joint establishment of a general market together with a 
county government in North Korea’s North Hamgyong 
Province. This is the second such joint market, emulat-
ing a prior initiative between North Korea’s Sinuiju 
and China’s neighboring Dandong City.27
In response to its growing informal cross-border trade 
with China, Pyongyang is sending mixed signals, 
however, perhaps out of concern about a loss of con-
trol over profi t-making activity or because the North 
Korean authorities seek to hoard foreign currency. 
At any rate, soon after the inter-Korean summit of 
October 2007, North Korea raised the minimum age 
for female salespersons in markets from 35 to 49.28 
Market patrols aimed at enforcing fi xed prices also 
appear to be increasing. In the border areas, Chinese 
merchants are speculating that North Korean authori-
ties may start to limit or prohibit the sale of industrial 
goods in general markets.29 If imposed, the attempt to 
prohibit trading of industrial goods in general markets 
would imply a reversal aimed at strengthening planned 
economy functions.
External Economic Engagement Refl ected 
in North Korea’s Economic Data
Trade data clearly indicate that China and South 
Korea have become the two dominant foreign eco-
nomic partners for North Korea under Kim Jong-il 
(Figure 1). North Korea’s international trade, includ-
ing inter-Korean trade, has expanded since 1998 at a 
12 percent compound annual growth rate, increasing 
from about $1.7 billion to $4.35 billion in 2006. Figure 
1 shows that China has been North Korea’s largest 
trading partner since 1997, and that its primacy has 
been very much unrivaled—except by South Korea—
since 2002. Taken together, the two are responsible 
for about two-thirds of North Korea’s international 
trade by 2007.
27. “China-North Korea Joint Establishment of the Second General Distribution Markets at Border City [in Japanese],” Yonhap 
News Agency, 2 November 2007, http://Japanese.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2007/11/02/0300000000AJP2007110200240082.
HTML. 
28. Yang Jung-a and Jung Kwon-ho, “Update on North Korea Markets and Market Regulations,” Daily NK, 5 December 2007, 
www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=2991; see also “North Korea Will Turn the Jangmadang into Agricul-
tural Market? [in Chinese],” Daily NK, 10 December 2007, www.dailynk.com/chinese/read.php?cataId=nk00600&num=1358. 
29. Jung Kwon-ho and Yang Jung-a, “NK Forced to Revert to Agricultural Market System?” Daily NK, 11 December 2007, www.
dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=3011.
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Figure 1: North Korea’s Trade with Nations 
Participating in the Six-Party Talks, 
1997–2007, in millions of dollars
Sources: Customs Statistics, People’s Republic of 
China; Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 
Republic of Korea; Customs Statistics, Ministry of 
Finance of Japan; Census Bureau, U.S. Department 
of Commerce; Customs Commission, Russia; Radio 
Press; D.P.R. Korea Export and Import 2007 (Kyoto: 
World Trade Search, 2007).
Note: China 2007 is an estimate; it is an annualized 
figure based on January–November data.
Along with their shared prominence in North Korea’s 
overall trade, what is most striking to analysts is the 
sharp difference in the two countries’ trading patterns, 
as refl ected in the data. China’s engagement in North 
Korea has been pervasive across the four levels of ac-
tors described above, but the data also clearly indicate 
     NORTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS            103
the pronounced role played by China’s three north-
eastern provinces. Table 3 shows that North Korea’s 
trade with northeast China has consistently occupied 
large portions of the DPRK’s international trade. In 
2004, North Korean trade with Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang reached $1 billion, accounting for 32 
percent of North Korea’s total trade and 81 percent of 
its trade with China. In following years, despite the 
2006 missile launch and nuclear test, this steady trend 
did not change.China’s trade with North Korea reached 
$1.7 billion, of which the three provinces accounted 
for 66% in 2006.30
In the case of South Korea, the Ministry of Unifi ca-
tion’s stance supporting strengthened ties between the 
two Koreas through economic assistance, while also 
promoting purely commercial trade, comes through 
plainly in the data. Inter-Korean trade data as offi -
cially announced are categorized into commercial and 
noncommercial trade. According to that classifi cation, 
commercial trade and government-organized projects 
accounted for 56 percent and 44 percent, respectively, 
in 2000. A more useful classifi cation would be (1) 
commercial trade, comprising both general trade and 
processing-on-commission (POC) trade, which is 
commission based and uses North Korean labor but no 
North Korean industrial inputs; (2) government-spon-
sored trade, covering the inputs and product output of 
the Kaesong industrial complex; and (3) government-
organized transactions, comprising humanitarian 
aid, social and cultural cooperation projects, and the 
erstwhile light-water reactor project. During the fi rst 
nine months of 2007, by this breakdown, commercial 
trade, government-sponsored trade, and government-
organized transactions accounted for 46 percent, 24 
percent, and 30 percent, respectively.
Prominent here is the continuing leading role of the 
South Korean government in managing and organiz-
ing North-South trade, including through the Kaesong 
 
project (which represents the fastest-growing segment 
of North-South transactions as well as the primary 
target of South-to-North direct investment). Even this 
breakdown, in fact, overestimates the importance of 
true commercial trade in the North-South economic 
picture because POC trade inputs are basically double 
counted as exports from North Korea even though the 
actual added value of the economic activity consists 
only of the export of fairly simple labor services by 
North Korea.31
Conclusions and Key Observations
A quick overview of Chinese and South Korean 
engagement with North Korea, then, suggests that 
economic engagement can have a substantive impact 
on North Korean economic policy as well as on the 
empirical characteristics of how the North Korean 
economy functions in practical terms. But external 
economic engagement works best to transform the 
North Korean economy when multiple channels of 
engagement are employed simultaneously in order to 
get past the rigid regime’s dedicated gatekeepers and 
enforcers of communist orthodoxy. By encompass-
ing central government–level policy dialogue, local 
government channels, signifi cant and direct corporate 
interaction, and individual entrepreneurship, China’s 
economic engagement with North Korea has thus far 
had the most meaningful impact on that country’s 
closed system.
In particular, deepening economic ties between North 
Korea and China’s northeastern provinces have great 
potential to serve as a catalyst and a guide to help 
bring about changes in the direction of a market 
economy in North Korea. Northeast China is exposing 
North Korean offi cials, entrepreneurs, and residents 
to market-oriented business norms and giving them 
a taste of a market economy. The three provinces 
also demonstrate the tragedy of North Korea’s lost 
30. D.P.R. Korea Export and Import 2007 (Kyoto: World Trade Search, 2007). This report covers data for the most recent two years, 
2005 and 2006.
31. Note that South Korean efforts to help North Korea’s light industrial development have just begun. These initiatives, encom-
passing dispatching South Korean industrial experts to North Korean light industry factories and arranging for shipment of raw 
materials such as polyester fi ber to North Korea in exchange for access to mineral resources, could spur real trade. Seoul has of-
fered to provide $80 million in inputs for North Korea’s light industries such as shoe and garment manufacturing, and North Korea 
reportedly repaid $2.4 million of the loan by delivering 1,000 tons of zinc; see “Koreas Agree on Initial Economic Aid and Joint 
Mine Exploration,” quoted in Vantage Point 30, no. 6 (June 2007): 41; see also “2007 Biggest Year Yet For Inter-Korean Exchange 
at 1.79 Billion USD,” NK Brief (Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Seoul), no. 08-1-10-1,  http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/eng/m05/s10/
content.asp?nkbriefNO=177&GoP=%201.
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Table 3: North Korea–Northeast China Trade, 1998–2005, millions of dollars and percentage 
North Korean 
Trade 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Compound 
annual
growth 
rate or 
average
Total (a) 1,664 1,814 2,398 2,673 2,902 3,115 3,554 4,055 14%
Total with 
China (b) 
408 371 488 738 738 1,024 1,385 1,580 21%
Ratio of 
China/North 
Korea (b)/(a) 
25% 20% 20% 28% 25% 33% 39% 39% 29%
Subtotal for 
northeast
China
300 241 364 574 629 903 1,125 1,090 21%
Liaoning 204 157 236 390 462 622 786 823 22%
Jilin 79 78 118 169 152 253 283 241 17%
Heilongjiang 17 6 10 15 15 28 56 26 6%
Ratio for 
northeast
China/North 
Korea
18% 13% 15% 21% 22% 29% 32% 27% 22%
Ratio for 
northeast
China/China 
74% 65% 75% 78% 85% 88% 81% 69% 77%
Sources: Databases of the Ministry of Unification; Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA); and Korea 
International Trade Association (KITA); Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2006; Jilin Statistical Yearbook 2006; 
Heilongjiang Statistical Yearbook 2006; Liaoning Statistical Yearbook 2006; Jilin Nianjian, various years. 
Notes: Jilin-DPRK trade data on table for 1998, 2001, 2003 are author’s estimates. Compound annual growth rates for 
1998–2005 were calculated for total and subtotal amounts of trade; average growth rates were calculated for the ratios 
of trade. 
opportunities over the past several decades; given 
its similar initial conditions, North Korea could have 
realized similar or perhaps even better economic per-
formance than northeast China if appropriate opening 
and reform policies and institutional arrangements had 
been implemented.
If they coordinate strategically, China and South Korea 
should be able to complement each other in helping 
to transform the North Korean economy. South Ko-
rea’s engagement, which seeks reduction of military 
tensions and emphasizes trust-building, noncommer-
cial interactions, should not be dismissed as entirely 
non-transformative; it can also help promote change 
in North Korea although perhaps not effectively as 
China’s engagement.
China’s engagement should not be viewed as a threat 
to inter-Korean economic cooperation or eventual 
North-South reunifi cation. No single foreign actor 
can alone achieve the daunting task of transforming 
the North Korean economy. Nor should any foreign 
actor seek or claim a monopoly on infl uencing North 
Korea. Convincing North Korea to open and reform 
its economy is the highest priority, regardless of in-
terlocutor.
The ongoing six-party talks, which could eventually 
lead to more stable North Korean diplomatic relations 
with major powers such as the United States and Ja-
pan, may also end up playing a major catalytic role 
for North Korea’s economic and institutional change. 
Even if North Korea accepts the grand bargain of 
denuclearization and opens its economy and society 
to the broader outside world, China—as an enor-
mous neighbor, large market, increasingly signifi cant 
source of capital, and increasingly important trading 
partner—will continue to play a prominent role in 
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North Korea’s economic development in the future. 
South Korea, following its own path and imperatives, 
will not be far behind.
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Yonsei University and the Harvard-Yenching Institute. 
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